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Criticism, like the windmills of Don Quixote, is not always quite what it seems to be. It is 
certainly possible, if one wishes, to identify institutionalized forms and emergent (or atrophying) 
traditions of criticism, political or otherwise. One can also analyze the ‘public spaces’, occasions 
and styles of criticism as they have developed, or failed to, under different conditions in more or 
less uncivil societies. For various reasons I find difficulties with taking this approach seriously. 
Such false substantialism1 leads easily to delightful conclusions like so-called ‘western liberal 
democracies’ arguably suffering serious critical hyper-inflation and the rest of the world 
comparative critical recession. Part of the problem, I shall suggest, stems from trying to establish 
the essence of criticism out of context and from focussing on the critic at the expense of the critical 
audience. Like Don Quixote I may be tilting at windmills, in which case critical readers will 
doubtless subject me to suitable ridicule. The allusion to Cervantes is intended inter alia as a 
reminder, not least to myself, that a critical approach to criticism itself involves issues of complex 
changing genres, of which the heroic anthropologist cannot plead innocence without being foolish. 
 Let me begin naïvely. Criticism is a loose word. In everyday speech it may be attributed to 
anything from vituperation to damning with faint, or even fulsome, praise. What is Mark Anthony 
doing in those famous lines?  
For Brutus is an honourable man; 
So are they all, all honourable men (Julius Caesar iii, 2.) 
Criticism as a disciplinary term is a many-splendoured thing, but some of the presuppositions 
implicit in everyday usage carry over. Political cultures of criticism, as social criticism, is likely to 
be linked by most continental European readers, I imagine, to the long tradition of critical 
theorizing, most recently associated with the Frankfurt Critical School.2 Continental European – 
perhaps especially German – of usage is something which someone reared like myself more in 
Anglo-American academic discourse has to learn. From the standpoint of many academic subjects 
in Britain and the States, not excluding philosophy, criticism – let alone social criticism – is more 
than a little alien as a serious term. Criticism is not an integral part of knowing in the dominant 
empirical, positivist tradition, because if one’s senses are working normally and one has the correct 
methodology, there is no need for criticism. At best criticism tends therefore to be reduced to 
corrective treatment for methodological error and is associated more commonly therefore with 
criticism of one’s mental faculties or even personal abuse. This latter picks up on criticism in the 
Arts, where it is personal opinion (alias unnecessary subjectivity) outside fact and science. 
 Allowing for differences of usage, is it not possible however to identify among the range of 
instances features which are essential to critical statements, or at least which ones serious 
commentators agree are essential? There are two obvious points here. First, intellectual traditions 
are not watertight compartments. Whichever way we turn, the notion of ‘criticism’, whether in 
everyday speech or different disciplines, would appear to drag in the associations of judgement of a 
particular class or profession, which is represented as authoritative. Sometimes this 
authoritativeness is claimed to be underwritten by objective truth.3 In other words, criticism 
                                                
1 I avoid invoking the notion of ‘civil’ or ‘non-civil’ society, for the same reasons that I am sceptical about hypostatized 
accounts of criticism, discussed in detail below. I am grateful to Peter Worsley for first suggesting to me the possible 
relevance of Bakhtin to the analysis of Balinese history and theatre and to Ron Inden for his useful suggestions on the 
draft of this chapter.  
2 On the importance of Kant in constituting this argument about rationality, see Asad’s thoughtful discussion in this 
volume. 
3 Raymond Williams sums up some of the problems. The crucial development of the notion of criticism… 
depended on the isolation of the reception of impressions: the reader, one might now say, as the CONSUMER of a range of 
works. Its generalization, within a particular class or profession, depended on the assumptions of personal impressions and 
responses, to the point where they could be represented as the STANDARDS of judgment... The notion that response was 
involves relationships of knowledge and power. This bears on the second point. One needs to 
consider not just, or so much, what criticism is, as what is represented as criticism or critical, and 
the conditions under which judgements are held to be authoritative. And the question of what 
criticism is for, what its goals are, is generally overlooked. There are no grounds for exempting the 
widespread academic use of ‘critical’ and ‘critique’ from such reappraisal. Critical thinking about 
criticism is still in its infancy.4 Unfortunately the critical evaluation of the presuppositions in the 
writings of others is far more rarely carried through to the presuppositions of the critique itself. For 
instance, Clifford’s celebrated critiques of ethnographic writing are notably unself-critical about its 
own presuppositions (1983, 1986, 1988; cf. Hobart 1990). 
 Clearly I am treading on deep waters here, because the notion of criticism has been invoked in 
different ways. What I wish to do provisionally is suspend the search for an epistemological 
essence called criticism, in order to explore how the problem of commentary on public statements 
and actions is approached in one non-Western society in certain situations.5 If the issue of criticism 
is to be approached, as I wish to approach it, as particular historical and situated practices, then we 
may need to consider the circumstances under which utterances and actions are attributed with 
critical import and the rôle of listeners as active participants in deciding what are critical acts. Mark 
Anthony’s remarks about Brutus require the audience to do some work.  
 My argument is organized as follows. First I briefly consider recent forms of public criticism in 
Bali and in particular theatre, which has long been recognized as a privileged occasion for 
criticizing the failings of both audience and public figures. I then examine an excerpt from a 
shadow theatre play to argue that the audience plays a crucial rôle in whether and how to interpret 
what is said as critical. I conclude with an attempt to outline an account of criticism as part of the 
process of understanding. At best it is probably Quixotic tilting at the vision, implicit in much 
critical theory, of the critic as empyrean, as God, the intellectual or the scientist, who has some 
privileged position, set apart from the actualities of social life. This last is, incidentally, one 
definition of the sacred. 
 
Critical practices in Bali 
 One could, I suppose, write a history of forms of institutional criticism in Bali, although I am ill 
qualified to do so. It is, for instance, not very clear to me quite how Balinese villagers articulated 
their responses to the rule of royal courts and their stewards during pre-colonial and colonial times, 
not least because different accounts vary in representing this from a benign and largely symbolic 
domination to cruel exploitation.6 It is also unclear how far such discourse as there was was about 
the nature of the régime itself rather than about the perceived failings of particular incumbents to 
office. What seems more evident is that, after Indonesian Independence, there was very lively 
argument – indeed the present government’s view is that it was excessively lively and destabilizing 
– nationally, and to a degree locally, over the appropriate constitution and form of government for 
the country. In the aftermath of what is usually described as the abortive Communist coup of 1965 
                                                
judgment depended, of course, on the social confidence of a class and later a profession. The confidence was variously 
specified, originally as learning or scholarship, later as cultivation and taste, later still as SENSIBILITY. At various stages, 
forms of this confidence have broken down, and especially in C20 attempts have been made to replace it by objective 
methodologies, providing another kind of basis for judgment. What has not been questioned is the assumption of 
authoritative judgment (1983: 85-86). 
4 In fact, what are to my mind the more sensitive uses of the terms in anthropology carry precisely this note of 
reflexivity (e.g. Scholte 1974, 1978). 
5 It is striking how easily the notion of criticism lends itself to catachresis. For instance Kantian a priori categories are 
often used in English to give it the semblance of structure, as in ‘a space, or time, for criticism’ or even ‘the cause, or 
weight, of criticism.’ 
6 On the history of changing representations of Bali, see the account by Vickers 1989. 
and the mass execution of communist party members, there have been stringent precautions against 
the revival of party politics in favour of a consensual focus on economic development, guided by 
the state ideology of Pancasila. The effect has been the effective demise of debate on political 
alternatives and on overt criticism in favour of government directives and criticism of the populace 
for its failure on various grounds to implement these directives. In the village ward of Pisangkaja 
where I work, the living still have reason on occasion to recall the deaths of nineteen local men – 
about one in ten household heads – following the coup, an event which has continued to 
overshadow public life in various situations. 
 It would be easy to argue that recent events coming on top of the habit of subservience to 
aristocratic authority accounts for what might appear as the indirectness of much popular criticism 
in Bali in recent years. One could argue though with at least as much justification that Balinese 
widely appreciate skill in the use of rhetoric in public speech, not least as an index of the speaker’s 
maturity. Certainly there is a formidable repertoire of named rhetorical techniques (see Hobart 
forthcoming), of which those in authority are expected to be exemplary masters, even if they may 
fall short in practice. Argument in ward assembly meetings, in coffee stalls, indeed on many public 
occasions are often perceived as openly critical of the shortcomings of those in authority and not 
just those in the village. Despite the dirigiste ethos of government, it was interesting, if 
inconclusive, to note the frequency with which officials would complain to me about how hard it 
was to do or say anything without villagers raising a barrage of accusations of mismanagement, 
dereliction of public duty, impropriety and so forth. Although it is impressionistic and even 
ethnocentric, I am often struck by how intelligently critical Balinese villagers are in everyday life, 
compared say to the other society I know best, British academics. I would be lothe to pre-empt 
discussion of the processes of criticism by confining it to spuriously identifiable institutional forms. 
 There is one institution however which Balinese themselves often speak of as a vehicle of long 
standing for wide ranging public criticism, when necessary, namely theatre. There are many kinds 
of theatre, from the ‘classic’ shadow theatre found in several parts of the Indonesian archipelago, 
through various kinds of (masked or otherwise) genres of historical play, to popular drama (also 
notionally historical).7 Despite the arrival of television in rural Bali in the late 1970s and growth of 
a mass audience from the middle to late 1980s, theatre has long been and remains not just a popular 
form of entertainment, but a means of re-enacting Balinese history and a way of reworking cultural 
representations of what it is to be Balinese. It is almost obligatory to hold performances on each of 
the two or three nights of temple ceremonies, of which there are many, and on other occasions. So 
theatre is popular in every sense.  
 Plays are potentially critical in three inter-related ways among others. First they draw on what 
are considered to be accounts of the past (Balinese or, less commonly, Indian) to recreate political 
régimes, principally through court life, as examples which set the implicit standard against which 
the present may be judged.8 Second, the performers usually use the theme of the plot or the 
occasion to draw parallels with, or digress into remarks about, recent local happenings, usually to 
point to shortcomings, whether attributed to villagers or to the great and not-always-so-good. Third, 
                                                
7 For the ‘classical’ account of theatre in Bali, see de Zoete & Spies 1938. Classificatory accounts like these serve to fix 
a wide range of theatrical practices, which vary from place to place, into a constructed ‘system’. As Balinese come to 
read such accounts, they have the effect of providing the division into genres with a retrospective appearance of reality. 
Spies seems to have had an especially important and distinctive effect in helping to constitute the image of 
contemporary Bali to outsiders, including such anthropologists as Mead and Bateson, see Vickers 1989: 105-24. 
8 On the ways in which Balinese versions of Indian ideals of kingship, especially those from the Ramayana are 
reworked, see Worsley 1972. In what follows I use the appropriate diacritics when the original reference is in, or to, 
Old Javanese. I omit them, as is contemporary Balinese practice, when the original reference was Balinese. For 
instance niskala [use OJ] is the Old Javanese for ‘the unmanifest’, but Balinese simply niskala. 
it is common to use potential moral situations in the plot to give admonitory advice or cautions 
(panglèmèk) about how to behave and not behave in comparable situations in which people may 
find themselves. There is a vocabulary of the techniques used, known to the performers and more 
educated villagers. Whether, when and by whom, the plays are treated just as rattling good yarns, 
full of jokes, or as more morally edifying and critical commentary depends, as far as I have been 
able to establish to date, on the predilections of different villages and on age.9 On the whole, older 
villagers expect shadow theatre to dwell at the greatest length on the nature of the polity and to 
include the most moral and didactic commentary, and popular drama the least. How much 
potentially current criticism is included, and how elegantly or effectively it is phrased, depends on 
the skill of the performers. It is this last aspect that tends to suffer most in televised plays; and is 
often replaced by explicit lectures on what government requires of the masses. However I have 
seen several broadcasts, which the audience read as trenchantly critical of pomposity and 
inefficiency of self-serving officials. The professional actors with whom I spoke were well aware 
of the greater caution needed when they appeared on television, but interestingly they almost 
always said that the absence of a live audience was what hampered them the most. Why this might 
be so, we shall see shortly. 
 One can only go so far with sweeping generalities, so let me turn to one actual shadow theatre 
performance. Balinese shadow theatre draws its plots mainly from the nine parwas of the Indian 
Mahabharata, and more rarely from parts of the Ramayana, which have been rendered into Old 
Javanese, the textual language of Java and Bali, by local scholars (see Pigeaud 1967:116-19). An 
important addition are servants, often glossed as ‘clowns’, who paraphrase or comment in Balinese 
on what the textual characters do and say in Old Javanese. While accepted wisdom has it that the 
audience does not understand Old Javanese, and therefore much of what is being said, this is far 
from true; but it is too good a neo-colonial representation of the ignorant native to be often 
questioned. 
 The occasion of the shadow theatre play in January 1989 before an audience of some 400 was a 
large festival in the lineage temple of the local royal court, the prince of which was also head of the 
local administrative village, perbekelan, and widely spoken of as weak and favouring his cronies. 
The puppeteer, dalang, was from a village ten kilometres away and from a senior, but less powerful 
and affluent, branch of the same family, the Cokorda (‘foot of the god’, one may not address more 
elevated parts of the royal personage). The story, lakon, which the puppeteer chose was a minor 
episode dealing with the fate of Aswageni, the son of Arjuna by the daughter of a serpent (variously 
identified). He is rejected by his father, despite proving conclusively who he is. He is then deceived 
by a heavenly nymph, dedari, whose clothes he stole while she bathed and who agreed to marry 
him if he returned her clothes. (This last always sets up trouble.) Aswageni’s grandfather, Brahma, 
gives him the power, sakti, to destroy even the gods in heaven, at which point he transforms into 
the demon, Sang Nata Kawaca. The plot ends with the gods – not unlike a number of contemporary 
political régimes – stripped bare of power and pretence, wondering how to save themselves. (In the 
parwas the story concludes with Sang Nata Kawaca revealing the source of his power when he is 
tricked by the nymph in cahoots with his own father, Arjuna, who kills him.) 
 The scene translated below is an intermezzo as Sang Nata Kawaca, in his ferocious 
transformation, Détya, is about to wreak havoc in heaven accompanied by his two servants, the 
brothers Dèlem and Sangut. Sangut, by repute the wily one, bumps into that most sinister denizen 
of the other world, Sang Suratma. Somewhat like the Greek Moirai, he determines the moment of 
                                                
9 Men sometimes claim that women in general are less interested in the moral aspects of theatre - a view disputed by 
women. In part the claim seems linked with the fact that shadow theatre conventionally attracts a larger male audience 
than other genres. From my research to date on women’s commentary on theatre and morality, my impression is that, if 
anything, they are at least as sensitive as men to the moral aspects of plots and situations in everyday life. 
death by writing one’s death warrant or, in Balinese imagery, by crossing one off his list. The scene 
ends with the approach of Sang Nata (Détya) Kawaca. 
 
On bribing a God 
Italic type indicates words in Old Javanese; 
Bold type indicates words in English; 
Underlined type indicates words in Indonesian. 
Sangut: Ooh! I beg your pardon, but is this the king of the pemedi or a God?10 I have never 
seen anything like it, is it a pemedi or a sea slug? 
Sang Suratma: Hey! Who are you calling a seaslug? Don’t insult me like that.11 You are in the 
Presence of none other than Lord Suratma. 
Sangut: Oh. Are you Lord Suratma? 
Sang Suratma: That is right. I write the letters which seal the fate of human souls. If you do wrong, 
I cross you off. If I cross you off with red ink, you’re dead. 
Sangut: Oh. So that’s it. Now, if I offered you money, you wouldn’t cross me off?12 
Sang Suratma: Ah! If it’s a lot of money, I’ll arrange to cancel it. If it’s only a little, say enough to 
buy root crops,13 you’ll still be struck off. If it’s half,14 I’ll half cross you off. You’ll 
be very ill indeed. 
Sangut: If it’s lots and lots and lots of money.15 I mean as much as I have got? 
Sang Suratma: Ah! If it’s really a lot, then I’ll cancel the crossing-off totally.16 You can live to be 
two hundred and ninety years old. That’s how it is. 
Sangut: Bah! That’s wicked of you to be calculating like that. You shouldn’t do that, even if 
you are in charge of the letters. Only if someone’s done wrong should you cross 
them off. Don’t mix money up in it, you should be ashamed of yourself. 
Sang Suratma: Why not? If I don’t, my children will have nothing to eat. 
Sangut: Worse still! You shouldn’t do it. You shouldn’t do it. Don’t try and talk your way 
out of it. 
Sang Suratma: Wow! Who are you anyway? Are you a soul? 
Sangut: I am a servant. 
Sang Suratma: So. What have you come here for? 
Sangut: I am following my master. 
Sang Suratma: Détya Kawaca? 
Sangut: Yes. 
Sang Suratma: Bah! If that’s the case, I’ll beat you to death. In short, you’re done for. 
Sangut: I heard! I wouldn’t do it. Why beat me to death? Those letters you’re carrying, just 
use those. Don’t start asking to beat people to death as well. 
Sang Suratma: Where is Détya Kawaca? 
Sangut: Who’s this, sir? If I were you, I would get away before he tramples you underfoot, 
and you shit in your pants.17 Don’t go near him. 
                                                
10 Pemedi are a kind of malignant spirit. They are usually invisible to humans, but by report they are horrifyingly ugly 
and misshapen. Sangut is being deliberately insulting about a figure whom he knows to be divine, if not what divinity. 
11 There are two contrasting senses of ajum, which usually connotes ‘to flatter’, but may also be ‘to denigrate’. It 
suggests heavily value-laden comments about a person for a purpose. 
12 Throughout Sangut addresses Sang Suratma properly by his full title but, for the flow of the English, I have simply 
glossed this as ‘you’. 
13 Taro, sweet potatoes -poor food by Balinese standards. 
14 In the play it is not clear half of what. In their commentary the Balinese I asked said it was half of whatever wealth 
Sangut had. 
15 The original word used by the puppeteer was ‘pull’, the English word ‘full’, which has crept into Indonesian. I have 
glossed it more idiomatically. 
16 The original was ‘total’. 
Sang Suratma: Eh! I don’t want to get trampled on. I’m off, right now. 
Exit Sang Suratma, Enter Dèlem 
Sangut: (To himself) I didn’t know there were still Gods around who did their hair in knots 
as if they were wearing caterpillars! 
Dèlem: Who was that ‘Ngut? 
Sangut: That’s an old acquaintance from years ago, although I haven’t seen him for a long 
time. 
Dèlem: Since when did you have friends in heaven? 
Sangut: A long time. We used to go off looking for work sawing wood together. 
Dèlem: Oh! Why are Gods going along with you to look for work sawing wood together? 
Sangut: That was Lord Suratma, the one who seals your fate. He kept shouting he wanted 
you, he really wanted to lay into you, jump up and down on you and smash your 
head in. He does it by writing you off with red ink. If he does it across your chest, 
you’ll get lung trouble. If his pen goes right up to your head, your brain goes soft.18 
Dèlem: Oh! That Lord Suratma’s not so smart. (Shouting) I just want to twist, twist, twist 
his neck until it’s kite string, chop it off with a knife, tug it till it comes off, smash 
his teeth in with a rock, smash him up, smash him up till he yells out, kick him into 
hell, so that for once His Excellency Lord Suratma himself should go to hell. (Then, 
hearing Détya Kawaca approach, he reverts to an obsequious tone) I’m coming, 
my Lord. 
 
A problem of commentary 
 It may be helpful to take the reader briefly through this scene.19 Sangut, the servant, is both re-
enacting ‘popular Balinese ambivalence’ towards a dread figure and showing not so much his gall, 
as anticipating his cleverness. When Sang Suratma objects to being called a sea slug, the puppeteer 
neatly hints at two related themes in his use of the Balinese root ajum, which suggests either 
flattery or denigration (see the footnote above). Without being explicit, and so leaving it to the 
audience to draw the inferences, the puppeteer is playing upon the ambivalent behaviour of 
underlings towards their superiors, where public obsequiousness goes hand-in-hand with more 
cautiously expressed criticism, or even excoriation. There is also an allusion to the popular view 
that flattery, or sucking-up, gets you anywhere with self-important officials in contemporary Bali. 
 The next section is a parody on bribery, made the more contemporary by the introduction of a 
couple of English words which are known to some of the younger and more educated Balinese. It 
ends with Sangut being offered an inflated boon, a most unlikely promise because no one in Bali 
has been known to live to be two hundred and ninety. Once again the ‘sub-text’ is a warning 
against trusting assurances about what the great and good claim they will do for someone in the 
indefinite future – a theme echoed in the plot as a whole, which dwells on the failure of the 
notionally ‘good’ Pandawa brothers to fulfil their promises. At this point the mood changes and 
Sangut pushes Sang Suratma into the whingeing and hypocritical justification of his corruption, so 
often heard in life. Suratma then re-exerts his authority (Who are you anyway? ‘I’ll beat you to 
death.’) only to have its logic undermined by Sangut, who sets it against the immediate threat of 
real physical violence. (Sang Suratma carries out his lethal work, like many Balinese lords, from a 
safe distance – in his case cosmologically or narratively.) The episode is also an elegant 
instantiation of the complex relationship of superior and inferior, which carries the reversal of 
                                                
17 The reference is to a particular kind of diarrhoea, often associated with fear. It also looks like an indirect reference to 
Sang Suratma’s habit of farting repeatedly. The judge over death himself has the characteristics of a man close to death. 
18 I.e. ‘you go mad’. Evidently this is the Balinese equivalent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. 
19 Pace Sperber and Wilson (1982, 1986), there is much background (‘pre-text’ in Derridean terms) which cannot be 
inferred by some theory of contextual implication. 
formal ideology within it. Sangut appears to offer a suggestion (‘If I were you...’) which is, 
perlocutionarily, a warning, almost a threat. A major, if often partly implicit, topic in theatre is the 
kaleidoscopic relationship of master and servant, patron and client. The passage is a commentary 
upon the recurrent theme in this play and others on agency, on the extent to which servants subtly 
alter or criticize their master’s wishes and orders in various ways, while seeming to maintain a 
suitable deference. 
 With the arrival of Sangut’s elder brother, Dèlem, the mood shifts again to play cleverness 
against a parody of rustic simplicity and bombast, a structural possibility of the brothers’ as often 
cast. The puppeteer is also moving back to familiar, and safer, ground after what was taken as 
trenchant criticism of the host and distinguished officials in the audience. Sangut plays upon his 
important connections, and so patronage (‘Since when did you have friends in heaven?’), by 
suggesting the humble realities (‘looking for work sawing wood’) to which people with grand titles 
often have to descend in practice. Before the recent introduction of electricity, it was not unusual to 
see impoverished men of aristocratic lineage (usually lower ranking Satriya and Wèsiya) sweating 
over the semi-skilled, but heavy and menial, labour of sawing planks by hand. (The puppeteer had 
such a magnificent title himself and, from my conversations with him, it was clear that he was 
aware of the ironies.)  
 Sangut then spells out and, by its absurd specificity, lampoons the link between divine agency 
and death. Sangut’s unadorned account of the workings of divine punishment as simply mechanical 
offers a neat parody of the imagery with which spirit mediums may try to persuade their clients of 
their skill and insight into the workings of the non-manifest (niskala). Balinese often find 
themselves in need of mediums while being sceptical of the good faith of many practitioners, an 
ambivalence which is nicely touched on by the puppeteer. The scene ends with Sangut succeeding 
in pushing Dèlem into empty bravado – his ‘stock’ role – at least while there is no real threat. 
Dèlem’s seemingly picturesque images of violence once more touches on the emphasis in certain 
texts upon ‘fantastic and gruesome methods of warfare’, ‘elaborate, and to our taste exaggerated’.20 
More immediately it is a picayune imitation of the threatening language used by Bima, the second 
of the five Pandawa brothers, and the rivals of Dèlem’s own usual masters. Bima’s threats are truly 
intimidating because he tends to carry them out; Dèlem’s are not only empty bombast, but lead to 
the absurdity of promising to condemn to hell the being in charge of determining such a fate.21 
Dèlem’s collapse into obsequiousness is not brought about though by the return of Sang Suratma, 
but simply of his own master approaching. Anachronistically, I am reminded of Jean Genet’s Les 
Bonnes. 
 Such a reading however raises almost as many problems as it promises to clarify. How, for 
instance, did I settle on this commentary? The great mystery of much anthropological interpretation 
is how it is arrived at. To the extent that it is illuminating, it may be because it appeals to our own 
momentarily significant categories. After all, I have said nothing yet about what Balinese made of 
the scene, or the play. The evident difficulty is that members of audiences in Bali and elsewhere 
often do not form clear-cut views or communicate them as academic commentaries. The 
assumption that people do rests upon what Reddy (1979) has shown to be a beguiling ‘conduit 
metaphor’ of meaning: that language is a vehicle which contains a meaning, transmitted from the 
                                                
20 A. Teeuw et al, Siwaratrikalpa of Mpu Tanakun (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), 32, 31. 
21 Dèlem’s logical confusion points to the disjuncture of the worlds of the audience and the narrative. Gods are niskala, 
non-material, unmanifest, and therefore largely unknowable to humans. Yet textually they are described as having 
quasi-human attributes as when they lust after humans, fight, flee and so forth. In what sense one can speak of Sang 
Suratma as in, as opposed to of, hell points to the divergence of textual and everyday narratives, the ambiguity being 
compounded by the servants, who are at once characters in theatre (but not in the written epics), but also imitate ‘real’ 
servants. 
speaker to receptive listeners. An imaginary mental entity, the meaning of the play, and an 
essentialist question ‘what do people think’ of a performance bears directly on problems of 
understanding theatre. To explore these issues, I outline briefly first what Balinese did say about 
the play and under what circumstances. Then, I suggest an alternative approach to social criticism, 
which requires revising presuppositions about agency. 
 In fact, the commentary above is a hybrid. It is based partly on my own inferences from the 
inadequate base of having worked for four years in the community in question.22 It is based more 
substantially on a commentary, lasting for over eight hours of tape alone, by a group of four men in 
the audience, who often gathered to chat over such matters in the coffee-stall belonging to the wife 
of one of them, and with whom I often worked. Who they are – or rather that they are who they are, 
and not the manifestation of the hermeneutic spirit of the Balinese – is relevant to my argument. 
 Briefly the group consisted of an 83 year-old actor, a poor scion of the Cokorda family and a 
former leading teacher of Arja, ‘romantic operetta’ (as poor a gloss as I have encountered). Then 
there were two Pradéwa, members of the rival aristocratic dynasty, a wealthy seventy-year-old 
farmer and shadow theatre buff; and his neighbour, a very poor ex-flower seller in his sixties with a 
genius for the idiosyncrasies of language. The last was a low-caste driver in his early fifties, the ex-
village head, well-known actor in popular drama and one-time professional hit-man (and when 
necessary my body guard). It is a slim basis in evidence, but anthropological evidence is usually 
much thinner, Geertz’s Thick description (1973a) notwithstanding. 
 As we were walking back from the performance, these men were discussing how well the 
performance compared with those of other good puppeteers. The flower-seller approved of the 
panglèmèk, the (perlocutionary) effect on anyone listening seriously and the oblique criticism 
(sesimbingin) of people who are corrupt. The old actor and the driver kept chuckling over how 
neatly these had been woven in. ‘Like sitting on a banana stem’, the driver said, ‘you get a wet 
arse’ replied both the Pradéwa with smiles.23 (Every act has its consequences.) They then settled 
down to considering how good the voices and movements of the various puppets had been, 
interrupted by one or another retelling relevant bits of the plot, to suggest that Arjuna had behaved 
badly. The farmer became quite irritated though and complained that the puppeteer had got the 
genealogy of the serpent wrong. We dispersed. 
 On three of the following five nights, I asked these men what they thought of the performance 
in more detail. With the lapse of time they had become more critical and reflective. A major theme 
was Brahma’s gift of power, sakti, to Aswageni/Sang Nata Kawaca. The old actor could not decide 
whether this was justified or not. Brahma and Wisnu, he said, were the specialist warriors among 
the Gods.24 Should Brahma though have put his grandchild before the state (here heaven, suarga) 
or not? The driver thought it a good example of putting family first and government second. 
Brahma forgot his duty to heaven. The farmer said the problem was Sang Nata Kawaca was 
overcome by desire, kamomoan,25 in thinking himself too sakti and in wishing to destroy heaven. 
The driver retorted by giving examples of how the Cokorda who was the village head put personal 
and ward interests before those of the village as a whole. 
                                                
22 While it is voguish to question any equation of time in the field and authoritative knowledge, at least time so spent 
does not preclude the possibility of acquaintance with what people said and did. The anti-empirical thrust of so much 
interpretive anthropology however, is not unconnected - in those instances I know of - with the very poor ethnography 
of its proponents. 
23 ‘Caranegakin (ge)debong’, ‘belus jitné. 
24 Siwa is often spoken of as superior to the other two deities of the Tripurusa and so more remote from direct 
intervention in human affairs. He is not therefore more ineffectual. On the contrary, he often emerges as the quiet agent 
of action, other deities being the instruments. 
25 The term connotes wildness and lack of reflectiveness. It seems often to be considered a consequence of arrogance. 
 They then turned to the scene of Sangut and Sang Suratma. The actor and farmer did not think 
it appropriate to introduce corruption. It turned out though, that, when the other two queried them, 
their reservations were not about its introduction into the plot, but that it was an indelicate matter to 
speak of openly. They agreed that it was good advice on how not to behave and that the audience 
greatly appreciated and laughed over the episode. They all then became involved in a technical 
discussion of exactly what rhetorical device the puppeteer had used. (Balinese have a complicated 
vocabulary for such indirect criticism.) They were laughing at how Sangut had tried to bribe Sang 
Suratma, until I asked whether it was he who had started it. Rapidly they switched – evidence of 
how an anthropologist, despite oneself, affects interpretation – and gave some splendid examples of 
how the powerful frighten the weak into offering them gifts or bribes. It was the image of Sangut 
trying out a bribe and the fact that he took the first action to which they returned – so much for the 
anthropologist’s intervention. 
 Finally they came to Aswageni’s behaviour. The old actor and the farmer spent a long time 
working through his genealogy to determine the antecedent pattern of events (to see if it threw any 
light on the justness of his actions). The flower-seller interjected that Aswageni had been tricked: 
he had been pushed to desperation (of which last the flower-seller had experience). They then 
suddenly agreed that the fault was Aswageni’s because in transforming into a giant (raksasa), he 
changed character accordingly. The actor said that, anyway, Suprabha had not been duplicitous and 
went back to his memory of other versions he had heard, where there was no mention of deceiving 
Aswageni. The farmer added that Aswageni had let his desires overwhelm him and couldn’t face 
the difficulties (sangsara) of life. It wasn’t, they decided, the gift of sakti which made him arrogant 
and want to destroy the Gods themselves. They then turned to Arjuna. The driver said that he was 
embarrassed to admit in front of his family that he had slept with a serpent (and been deceived by 
her human form). No, said the actor, Arjuna had sired so many children, he had forgotten the 
circumstances in most cases! How could he remember them all? If he had forgotten, where was the 
fault? The driver replied that forgetting is a fault and they all, the actor included, concurred. 
 ‘Does Arjuna get to heaven?’ the driver asked. They then reviewed what they could remember 
of the end of the Mahabharata to check. (The point seemed to be to find out whether one could 
establish fault or not by the consequences of actions, karma pala. Arjuna did not make it.) The 
driver, who had been musing for some time, then came up with an explanation which silenced 
everyone. Arjuna is embarrassed because his son had grown up and Arjuna had never performed 
the requisite life-cycle ceremonies (manusayadnya). And further he had never married Aswageni’s 
mother. So Aswageni is illegitimate to boot. With this, they said that that was as much as they had 
to say on the performance and conversation moved on to other matters. 
 No matter how great one’s ethnographic or textual knowledge, it is not possible to anticipate the 
drift of the discussion or the grounds of criticism. I am not, of course, arguing that this example is 
representative of Balinese thinking. On the contrary, the diversity of views makes it difficult to 
settle upon definitive interpretations, or to define the parameters of criticism. I would suggest that 
such regularity as is perceptible may be more appropriately discerned in the style of argumentation, 
in how Balinese set about understanding and commenting on actual performances. 
 
Agency in theatre 
 It is time to consider what these titbits of Balinese ethnography have to do with the political 
culture of social criticism and questions of agency in analyses of theatre and history. This bears 
directly on criticism. I shall argue that, because social criticism may not have been institutionalized, 
it does not follow that criticism does not occur as a practice. Further, a focus on practice raises 
questions about how useful it is to talk of a ‘culture’ of social criticism as some essential, 
distinctive institution. We tend to stress of the act of criticism and the critic as agent, at the expense 
of the situations in which listeners infer critical intent. 
 One might note to begin with though that there is an important form of closure in Western 
accounts of indigenous textuality and critical thinking. Commentary and criticism are considered 
largely Western prerogatives or abilities. Natives are commonly represented as believing naively; 
Westerners judge critically or, like Kierkegaard, believe tempered by doubt. Natives have symbols 
(which allow – hermeneuts to identify – prolix interpretations): we have reason, which of its 
essence is potentially critical, as in ‘critical theory’, which relies upon the use of rationality in some 
form. A good example of this trend is to be found in the ‘rationality debate’, which is shot through 
with highly dubious assumptions about the supposedly quite uncritical nature of natives’ beliefs. 
Even the serious possibility of commentary is taken away. Academics’ use of native informants is 
reminiscent of Dutch colonial policy. They provide the raw material, or the crude labour, from 
which Westerners engineer finished products. Remarkable as it may seem, to the best of my 
knowledge no one has ever asked Balinese systematically to comment on their own activities, 
largely I suspect because as mere instruments of their culture no one seems to have considered that 
they could, and do, comment at length.26 Clifford Geertz’s apparently generous suggestion (1973b) 
that the Balinese cockfight is a meta-social commentary is something of a backhanded compliment. 
There is an awful lot of blood spilt and money invested for a drop of critical reflection, which is 
itself static and incapable of leading to change. Anyhow it takes the Western superior knowing 
mind, or rather Geertz’s, to discover the commentary at all. 
 Much confusion has been caused by the conflation of text as a particular work and textuality, its 
context of creation or reproduction. The focus on the former as ‘the text’ tends to privilege the 
products of acts of inscribing (whether written or oral) and so separate them as the essential object 
of study independent of their performance, be this, say, reading (including reading to oneself) or 
enacting in theatre. It also defers attention from both performances and commentaries, which 
arguably form part of textuality as a practice. The complementary notion to this rigidified text is 
‘voice’, the expression of human consciousness and inter-subjective awareness which becomes 
codified through cultural inscription (see Hobart 1990: 306-12). If one looks at the much-vaunted 
examples of these true voices speaking, one discovers they are much the same as what we ignorant 
bunglers do when we interview people.27 Far from being unmediated by the distorting process of 
conventional ethnographic writing, such quests for the authentic native voice turn out to beg all the 
old questions of translation and are supremely the product of the inquisitive anthropological 
enterprise. In my experience (sic), in most societies people do not go around soliloquizing on their 
lives either without invitation or without being considered distinctly odd. The primrose path of 
longing for such an originary site in which to anchor authenticity is as much a historically and 
culturally specific narrative construction as is the voice which it seeks as its object. 
 The image of ‘the text’ is central to most Western studies of history and theatre in Bali. Dutch 
philological scholarship was largely concerned with establishing the correct, or complete, version 
among the many rescensions which existed (e.g. Hooykaas 1966). Structurally-inclined 
anthropologists have similarly sought to establish the essential template of Balinese thought 
underlying its local diversity. Culture-as-text, proposed by interpretive anthropologists like Clifford 
Geertz, has in fact broadened, and mystified, the scope of ‘the text’ and, in treating symbols as the 
essence of culture instantiated in ritual and theatre, left it more transcendental than ever. Ironically, 
                                                
26 Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity enshrines the conditions of critical possibility, 
which in practice leaves most non-Western peoples only able to respond to conflicts or change and unable to bring 
them about endogenously. 
27 A good example is Crapanzano’s Tuhami: portrait of a Moroccan. 1980. 
in Geertz’s fullest account (1980: 104-34), the source for these symbols is none other than the 
abstracted version from Hooykaas himself (1964). Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 
 The essential object of study becomes text, structure, culture or symbols as the transcendental 
agent, and Balinese social groups and persons become the instruments through which agency-in-
general is manifest but which remain divorced from actual places and occasions. What is notably 
missing is any account of historically, situated practice or agency. For instance, Balinese read so-
called ‘dynastic chronicles’ (babad) to interested audiences on particular occasions and these 
readings constitute part of social action. The agents, to use Collingwood’s terminology (1942) are 
‘complex’ and consist in a group of people who have come together for a common course of action. 
The readings are part of a continuing process of social activity, in which the composition, public 
goals and future actions of such complex agents are reworked. At least until the advent of 
television, theatrical performances (often using ‘historical’ plots) were also performed on specific 
occasions at the invitation of complex agents, whether courts or local associations of various kinds. 
Local preferences about plots and style are discussed between performers and spokesmen for the 
group in question.28 
 The vision of Balinese audiences being the passive recipients of culture transmitted through the 
medium of actors implies an epistemological model of communication in which meaning becomes 
the ‘content’ to be transmitted. This gives rise to such questions as what Balinese think is the 
‘meaning’ of a story, history and so on, which has proven notoriously difficult, if not meaningless 
(sic), to try to establish. An alternative account of communication which recognizes the importance 
of agency in actual situations can be extrapolated from the work of Bakhtin. 
Bakhtin’s basic scenario for modeling variety is two actual people talking to each other in a 
specific dialogue at a particular time and in a particular place. But these persons would not 
confront each other as sovereign egos capable of sending messages to each other through the kind 
of uncluttered space envisioned by the artists who illustrate most receiver-sender models of 
communication. Rather, each of the two persons would be a consciousness at a specific point in 
the history of defining itself through the choice it has made – out of all the possible existing 
languages available to it at that moment – of a discourse to transcribe its intention in this specific 
exchange (Holquist1981: xx; italics in the original). 
The shift in emphasis to considering history-as-read and text-as-performed involves examining the 
consequences for subsequent social action on definite occasions in particular places. It raises, 
correspondingly, new questions about what Balinese do with, and following, such performances 
including any public interpretations that they might make and the consequences of these acts. 
 It is not possible here to elaborate on the implications of taking performance-as-practice on 
which see Hobart 1990, 1991). Rather I wish to note three points. First, there are advantages in 
approaching history and theatre this way. Not least it is more commensurable with Balinese ways 
of talking about such events and actions. It also avoids introducing questionable transcendental 
essences, like culture, language, meaning, space and time, and turns attention to what different 
agents do in different actual circumstances. There are neither grounds a priori nor empirically to 
assume that such agents necessarily behave essentially similarly. Many western academics still tend 
to write about processes which depend on complex agency as if they were substantive. Theatre then 
becomes ‘a public space’ – or more subtly ‘an institutionalized time’ – for criticism and we are 
launched into a wonderful journey of metaphorical make-believe. To judge from the popularity of 
works which represent other peoples’ actions in terms of images aimed at titillating Western 
                                                
28 As Zurbuchen noted however (1987: 236-38), the final choice remains with the puppeteer, who will not normally 
reveal to anyone which plot he intends to perform. This is in part because he is listening to the conversation while he is 
offered hospitality and may not have decided which plot and how best to play it. 
readers’ imaginations, it is too good a way to fame, if not fortune, to give up readily.29 In the 
ensuing excitement, we tend to forget that such an approach sidelines questions of how different 
and heterogeneous audiences and actors understand what they are doing, what they say about it and 
how it affects what happens subsequently. 
 Finally, I would like to note a methodological problem. Inviting Balinese to comment on the 
performance is artificial, in the sense that part of the commentary would probably not have 
happened, or happened as it did, had I not instigated the occasion for discussion. Before one 
dismisses the exercise as futile however, might I make two points? First, Johannes Fabian (1990: 3-
20) has advanced a tantalizing argument for treating ethnography itself as one performance among 
the many which are going on in social life. The sense of ‘performance’ here though differs 
significantly from current anthropological usage based on crude metaphors of culture-as-
drama(turgical). Second, on what are supposedly concrete (sic) accounts actually based? The 
alternatives are mostly not so much more artificial as plain imaginary. Either, like the 
interpretivists, we ignore the vulgar natives altogether and focus on the beauty of the symbols or 
meanings themselves. Or we have the eyes, ears and nose of the omnipresent, omniscient, and if not 
omnipotent quite surreal, empirical ethnographer – an imagination of surveillance not even 
dreamed of in Bentham’s Panopticon. It is difficult to be in all the places at the moments people are 
chatting over such performances: so the artificiality of such discussions is partly a practical 
problem. More generally Balinese villagers have other matters to occupy themselves with. The 
main point I wish to make though is the value theoretically in switching from the predominant 
stress on culture as a holistic transcendental agent to the diverse forms agency is argued as taking in 
actual situations and its consequences for anthropological analyses.30 
 
Bakhtin and Bali 
 
 The invitation to write this chapter gave me an opportunity to think about how Balinese rework 
their history and represent the world in theatre. An obvious starting point was the work of Bahktin. 
I have found it hard to square Clifford and Marcus’s, and their associates’, account (1986) with the 
author of Marxism and the philosophy of language under his nom-de-plume (if indeed it be that) of 
Volosinov. Descombes has noted that there seem to be two Foucaults, an American and a French 
one, with precious little in common.31 I have begun to wonder whether there were not (at least) two 
Bakhtins. (I subsequently discovered that Graham Pechey has arrived at an almost identical 
position, 1990: 31.) I shall not belabour the point here, because I wish to explore the possible 
relevance of Bakhtin to understanding Balinese theatre. 
                                                
29 To invert the title of Lakoff and Johnson’s well-known book Metaphors we live by (1980), I fear too often we create 
metaphors others die by. 
30 There was much discussion during the conference from which this volume derives on the relationship between 
criticism and violence. In part this turned on the question of whether violence was the continuation of politics by other 
means. As should be clear, I think such discussion is partly misguided, because it treats violence, like criticism, as a 
substantialized essence and ignores the circumstances under which people constitute acts as violent and attribute 
responsibility for them. 
31 As Descombes remarked 
the American Foucault is someone whom one would gladly engage in ‘dialogue’. The French Foucault does not believe in 
‘dialogue’.... Nor does he seek ‘a common language’ or respect venerable traditions (1987: 21). 
Bakhtin emerges as an amiable pluralist, whose method permits, or obliges, one to ‘find diverse ways of rendering 
negotiated realities as multisubjective, power-laden, and incongruent’ (Clifford 1986b: 15). It is not so much that we 
are told that dialogue ‘is not reducible to dialectic’, (Clifford 1986b:43, fn.) or even that Bakhtin-Volosinov has ceased 
to be a Marxist in any sense, but that he is to be found underwriting precisely the individualistic subjectivism which he 
so trenchantly attacked (Volosinov 1973: 48-52, 82-94). 
 Briefly, I would like to consider the possible applicability of Bakhtin’s ideas of ‘heteroglossia’, 
‘genres’ and ‘chronotopes’ to the analysis of Balinese shadow theatre, and the problems of using an 
approach derived from a quite different literary and historical milieu. Oxymoronically, 
anthropological pundits state that Balinese shadow theatre is both the hegemonic discourse of 
traditional authority and the most celebrated vehicle for criticism of that authority. Their own 
authority largely cannibalizes earlier sources, because no anthropologist knows the Old Javanese, 
high and low Balinese needed to understand what is said. 
 Bakhtin’s analyses of the history of European literature has a prima facie bearing on the study 
of theatre and criticism in Bali. First, it offers a way of talking about genres which need not be 
essentialized. Second, where people make use of different genres, or a single genre exemplifies 
diverse styles, the possibility of using one to comment critically on another is present. Third, 
Bakhtin’s (and Volosinov’s) arguments to the effect that discourse and texts are more usefully 
treated as dialogic than reduced to varieties of monologue seem relevant to the consideration of 
what Sweeney has called ‘radically oral societies’ (1987: 38; cf. Bakhtin 1981a, 1986a; Volosinov 
1973), of which Bali would arguably be an instance. My stress on the importance of texts and 
commentary as dialogically related performances can conveniently be linked with such a general 
approach. Bakhtin’s account of the phenomenon of ‘heteroglossia’, the diversity of languages or 
styles of speech (Bakhtin 1981b: 263), which he argues coexist in literary forms like the novel, can 
be applied for instance to theatre in Bali. Equally his analysis of uses of ‘chronotopes’, how space 
and time are narratively constructed or represented in different genres of European literature 
(Bakhtin1981c), would seem just as applicable. Precisely because such ideas of Bakhtin’s are so 
suggestive however, they can easily be adopted wholesale and uncritically. How far one can import 
or impose such notions on other peoples’ historically and culturally situated practices without 
coming an act of hegemony – and without anachronism and anatopism – needs to be considered (cf. 
Fabian 1983). 
 Let me therefore examine for a moment the light which Bakhtin’s work on chronotopes might 
throw on existing interpretations of theatre in Indonesia. Because such representations of space and 
time bear directly on how agency is portrayed, I shall confine myself here to these. According to 
Bakhtin the narrative construction of chronotopes differs between genres and is in fact away of 
differentiating them. 
The chronotope in literature has an intrinsic generic significance. It can even be said that it is 
precisely the chronotope that defines genre and generic distinctions (Bakhtin 1981c: 84-85.).32 
So it would seem that examining chronotopes may tell us something about genre. This definition of 
the link of chronotopes and genres creates problems, however translated, to which I shall turn 
shortly in a critical review of the applicability of Bakhtin to Bali. 
 Different ways of representing space and time may coexist and form part of heteroglossia. What 
grounds though do we have for thinking that notions of heteroglossia and multiple chronotopes 
might be worth applying to Bali? It would not be hard to argue a case for the applicability of ideas 
of multiple, divergent forms of speech to Balinese social activity. Ordinary language use is an 
example. Low caste people address their superiors in high Balinese and high caste people speak to 
their inferiors in low Balinese, the two being largely lexically distinct. In addition royal characters 
in most theatre speak Old Javanese, which is a different language altogether and that used for most 
‘classical’ written works. These forms of speech are often essentialized as complementary 
‘language levels’ but, as style, composition and often theme differ between them, ‘speech genres’ 
                                                
32 How one translates depends greatly on how one chooses to read the original: even here agency is irreducible, if 
ignored. Consider Godzich’s translation of Todorov’s translation of the same sentences (see my remarks on translation 
below), where ‘intrinsic’ becomes’ essential’ and ‘precisely’, ‘categorically’ (Todorov 1984: 83). 
may be a more useful gloss. Much of the nuance of Sangut’s exchange with Sang Suratma depends 
on his slipping from high to low Balinese, as he suddenly switches from supplication to telling 
Sang Suratma off for his greed, a subtlety which has obviously been lost in translation. In fact it is 
often not easy to translate an utterance from low Balinese into high, still less Old Javanese into 
Balinese. If one looks carefully at Balinese usage in theatre for instance, when servants are said to 
ngartiang the Old Javanese speech of the heroes, they rarely ‘translate’ in any literal sense. The 
word might be glossed at least as well as ‘paraphrase’ or even ‘comment’, which has the advantage 
of bringing out the agency involved in such translation.33 
 In what ways might differing, but coexistent, styles of speech or representations of space and 
time bear on shadow theatre in Bali? Most of what has been written on shadow theatre, wayang, is 
about the neighbouring island of Java, where matters are quite clear according to Clifford Geertz. 
There is no problem of heteroglossia it seems, nor how the audience appreciates what is going on. 
For ‘the average man "enjoys" the wajang without explicitly interpreting its meaning’ (Geertz 
1973c: 138). Indeed it is possible for a perceptive anthropologist to tell us what Javanese see or 
look for in it. 
It is not the external world of principalities and powers which provides the main setting for human 
action, but the internal one of sentiments and desires. Reality is looked for not outside the self, but 
within it; consequently what the wajang dramatizes is not a philosophical politics but a 
metaphysical psychology’ (Geertz 1973c:134).  
The authenticity of experience is neatly anchored because we are told that, for the Javanese 
...the flow of subjective experience, taken in all its phenomenological immediacy, presents a 
microcosm of the unverse generally; in the depths of the fluid interior world of thought-and-
emotion they see reflected ultimate reality itself’ (1973c:134).34 
 If agency seems to be displaced in this account from the puppeteer and audience, a further 
displacement also takes place. For  
events are not just there and happen, but they have a meaning and happen because of that meaning 
(Geertz 1973c: 131). 
The time-bound realities of good and evil, pleasure and pain, love and hate are dwarfed and 
rendered meaningless by the timeless and ultimately amoral background against which they are 
fought out’ (Geertz 1960:270). 
Here, not only is meaning the cause, or transcendental agent, of human actions, but theatre carries 
the audience temporarily into that transcendent realm. Significantly Geertz’s analysis involves no 
epistemological problems: the categories are universal and there is no problem of different or 
contradictory representations. At least, if matters are not straightforward, we are not told how 
Geertz manages to produce such a confident interpretation. 
 Also writing about Java, Becker has proposed what, at first sight, is a quite different 
interpretation. The gods, heroes, giants and clowns occupy ‘a multi-cultural world, a world of 
multiple epistemologies’ (1979: 212; note that ‘culture’ and ‘epistemology’ are near synonyms 
here). 
                                                
33 Lakoff has recently contrasted translation and understanding. ‘Accurate translation requires close correspondences 
across conceptual schemes; understanding only requires correspondences in well-structured experiences and a common 
conceptualizing capacity’ (Lakoff 1987: 312). Not only are we lumbered with a universal, asocial and a priori 
prescription consisting of correspondence theory squared and a realm of mental entities (concepts), but also essences 
galore in speech treated as reified monologue. 
34 cf. Taylor (1985) on the problems of conceiving of ‘the self’ in terms of spatial metaphors of interiority and 
exteriority. 
In the coincidence of epistemologies...the real subtlety of [shadow-theatre] appears. The major 
epistemologies are (1) that of the demons, the direct sensual epistemology of raw nature, (2) that 
of the ancestor heroes, the stratified, feudal epistemology of traditional Java, (3) that of the ancient 
gods, a cosmological epistemology of pure power, (4) that of the clowns, a modern, pragmatic 
epistemology of personal survival...Between each of these epistemologies there may be – and 
usually is – a confrontation and a perang, a battle’ (1979: 224).  
Although he does not cite Bakhtin, Becker’s analysis of epistemologies involves different ways in 
which person and agency are represented in narrative. These depend upon constructions of 
‘temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature’ (1981c: 84).35 What is 
more, Becker is quite unambiguous that heterogeneous epistemologies coexist in shadow theatre as 
performed. 
 Becker’s analysis was an important and influential break with the then-fashionable, largely 
contextless and unsituated interpretation of symbols as a monologic system and a route into the 
hidden recesses of the Javanese mind. Unfortunately the break is not complete enough; and the 
difficulties into which Becker’s study runs show how agency all too easily becomes displaced onto 
abstract entities and the anthropologist’s narrative takes over from the original subject. It is 
epistemologies which confront one another, ancient gods which are resurrected (as if they were not 
contemporaneous, which they certainly are in Bali), natures and traditions made manifest rather 
than invented (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) or reproduced. While Becker starts promisingly with a 
radical view of what is going on in shadow theatre, he gradually conflates ‘epistemology’ with 
‘world view’ and ‘culture’, so we are back to a view reminiscent of Clifford Geertz, which is 
perhaps why Geertz hailed this article as an example of his interpretive method (1983: 31-32; cf. 
Hobart 1982). However interesting Becker’s insights, they are ultimately cast, as are Geertz’s, in 
the Orientalist’s timeless Asia of Hegel’s unfettered imagination.36  
 In other ways, Becker’s analysis of shadow theatre is reminiscent of Bakhtin’s depiction of the 
epic in Western literary history in its vision of meetings as brought about not by will or human 
agency, but by chance, in a world without hours or days which leave a trace.  
All moments of this infinite adventure-time are controlled by one force – chance...this time is 
entirely composed of contingency – of chance meetings and failures to meet. Adventuristic 
"chance time" is the specific time during which irrational forces intervene in human life; the 
intervention of Fate (Tyche), gods, demons, sorcerers...Moments of adventuristic time occur at 
those points when the normal course of events, the normal, intended or purposeful sequence of 
life’s events is interrupted. These points provide an opening for the intrusion of nonhuman forces – 
fate, gods, villains – and it is precisely these forces, and not the heroes, who in adventure-time take 
all the initiative’ (Bakhtin 1981c: 94-95, italics in the original).@ 
In Western epic, according to Bakhtin, space is abstract and lacks the distinctiveness of any actual 
place, with its people and history. 
The nature of a given place does not figure as a component in the event; the place figures solely as 
a naked, abstract expanse of space’ (1981c: 100).  
Here heroes undergo events, but remain basically unchanging. For 
It goes without saying that in this type of time, an individual can be nothing other than completely 
passive, completely unchanging...to such an individual things can merely happen. He himself is 
                                                
35 See also the long section where Becker lays out a intriguing account of how narrative constructions of space and time 
in Javanese shadow theatre differ from Aristotelian principles (1979:216-26). 
36 Where, as Ron Inden has noted, we find ‘an Idealism of the imagination, without distinct conceptions;- one which 
does indeed free existence from Beginning and Matter(liberates it from temporal limitations and gross materiality), but 
changes everything into the merely Imaginative’. (1990: 7; citing Hegel 1956:139). 
deprived of any initiative. He is merely the physical subject of the action’ (1981c: 105, italics in 
the original).  
 In Becker’s account only the clowns live in something approaching the lived-in world, but as 
Bakhtin argues (talking about the emergence of the novel) ‘the clown and the fool, however, are 
"not of this world," and therefore possess their own special rights and privileges’ (1981c: 159). 
Anyway, Sangut reminded Sang Suratma that he was a servant, which is prima facie a quite 
different role. 
The servant is the eternal "third man" in the private life of his lords. Servants are the most 
privileged witnesses to private life’ (1981c: 124-25).  
Becker, rightly, stresses the extent to which different epistemologies, or chronotopes, are 
simultaneously portrayed in Javanese shadow theatre. He does not try to reduce its heteroglossia to 
monologue, far less attempt to epitomize all theatre or even the whole of Java in terms of a single 
genre in the way in which Boon, in a ludic response to the arduous business of ethnography, tosses 
up between the whole of Balinese culture being epic or romantic. In one of the most remarkable 
acts of essentializing I have encountered, Boon cheerfully concludes not that one can usefully talk 
about one strand of shadow theatre, or some kinds of literature or theatre as romantic, but that Bali 
as a whole is in some sense romantic (1977: 3-7). The implicit parallels between Becker’s and 
Bakhtin’s accounts are striking though. But are they the result of a remarkable confluence of 
ancient Greece and contemporary Java or the imposition of the superior knowing subject? One 
begins to wonder whether ethnography owes less to the Jumbo jet than to the time machine.37 
 There are, in short, grave difficulties in importing studies of European and American literature 
and theatre into Indonesia. It may be as well briefly to sketch out some of the problems. Clearly 
such studies may be of heuristic value in highlighting previously neglected topics and in providing 
an example of how a subject might be approached. As with the use of sustained metaphors in 
anthropological analyses however – whether culture as a language or a text, or politics as theatre – 
there is the demonstrable danger of turning a means of considering a problem into a substantialized 
essence, as also tends to happen with the notion of criticism. Metaphor is a contrastive way of 
illuminating an issue, which easily leads to a false identification of tenor and vehicle. Culture is 
neither a language nor a text; politics is not theatre. Similarly the use of Western ideas about genre 
to describe or understand literary and theatrical activity across societies or historical periods runs 
the risk of creating imaginary classifications and, more serious, of obscuring indigenous practices 
and commentaries. Classification arguably involves inter alia an act of power or attempted 
hegemony by those who assert the applicability, or worse the truth, of the classifications. 
 Bakhtin’s writing about genres has rightly engendered interest and discussion among Western 
academics. It follows neither though that his account if free of problems, nor that it may be applied 
without extensive reworking to societies, like Bali, which have at least a partly separate history of 
theatre and commentary. On my reading of Bakhtin’s work on chronotopes (1981c), there is a 
potential problem of Residual Unresolved Lurking Essentialism (what one might call RULE), 
especially if taken out of the context of his – and even more unambiguously Volosinov’s (1973) – 
writing on the dialogic nature of language-as-speech. Elegant and thought-provoking as it is, 
Bakhtin’s analysis of how space and time have been represented in different literary genres, at 
times he seems to be contrasting such representations with some external measure of ‘the real 
world’ of ‘everyday life’ and ‘biological and maturational duration’ (1981c: 150, 121, 90). At other 
times Bakhtin himself provides the criticism of the assumptions behind this extra-historical 
                                                
37 Although I am critical of certain parts of Becker’s analysis, or the presuppositions which inform it, he remains one of 
the most interesting and original American scholars writing on Java. His erstwhile student Zurbuchen (1987) has 
written an excellent account of the puppeteer as agent in Bali, although she does not use that particular terminology. 
yardstick38 by appearing to write about ‘real life’ as it is constituted in the heteroglossia of 
different, or certainly subsequent, narratives. 
 In Bakhtin’s depiction of the development of genres in Western literature, distinctive 
representations of space and time appear to inhere in, and to be fundamental to, certain written 
works. Should one however take the unsituated work as the appropriate object of study? Perhaps 
one should rather consider the work as it is read or enacted to a particular audience. Audiences do 
not, and can not, listen to a reading or watch a performance without some prior background and 
expectations, however hard it is to define these. Nor is it wise to conceive, as we tend to, of 
audiences as passive recipients of messages, according to the model criticized by Bakhtin himself. 
Even were Western audiences reduced to such passivity, I would argue that there is plenty of 
evidence that Balinese ones are not. An analysis of essential features of a written work without 
reference to what the readers and actors, but also the audience, may be putting in, assuming and 
understanding is an arid exercise. The importance of reading as an act is underwritten by the 
problems of working out how to understand Bakhtin’s writing on chronotopes. Ostensibly Bakhtin 
largely treats chronotopes there as determinable from the written work. Yet Bakhtin’s analysis of 
European literature is itself a particular historically situated reading, not the final determination of 
its essential features. A close consideration of much of his other writing, which stresses the dialogic 
nature not only of speech but of written works, suggests that it would be contradictory to take this 
at face value. Neither he, nor we, know how such epics were understood when actually read and 
performed. To paraphrase Quine: genre is what performances become when they are divorced from 
actors and audience and wedded to the work (Quine 1980: 22). 
 Bakhtin’s insights into the history of European literature offer suggestive ways of approaching 
the problem of discussing how Balinese represent space, time, causation and agency in different 
forms of theatre and writing. Direct comparison of Europe and Bali though is fraught with peril. 
Comparison makes all sorts of implicit assumptions and easily leads to hypostatizing the subjects 
being compared as if they shared essential features in common.39 Etymologically if nothing else, 
genre is cognate with both gender (and genus, see Baxter and Fardon 1992). The difficulty is that 
ideas about genus, that is kinds or classes of being and event, not only differ cross-culturally, but 
may be used indifferent ways in practice. Balinese ways of classifying things have barely begun to 
be studied but, in strong nominalist fashion, they tend to eschew ranked taxonomies based upon 
grouping kinds into genera in favour of a very large number of named terminal kinds. @foot{There 
are few general terms, such as beburon ‘animal’ and paksi ‘bird’, even ‘fish’ requires further 
clarification as ulam segara, ‘sea meat’. Even in using the word ‘theatre’, I am already imposing a 
genus term. The (high Balinese) word sasolahan covers what we would call theatre (including 
shadow theatre), a range of named dances and even, at one time, films.} Such a view, incidentally, 
is consistent with the widespread view that the visible world (sakala) is continually transforming 
(matemahan). 
 Attempts to classify Balinese theatre by genre are premature and may well be misplaced. 
Different named forms of theatre seem to be distinguished by a complex of factors which includes 
the textual sources of the plots, the repertoire of characters and the latters’ medium of 
representation (e.g. by masked, or unmasked, actors, by shadow puppets). New theatrical ‘genres’ 
which take elements from existing ones frequently appear; existing forms change; and of which 
‘traditional genre’ an actual performance is an example (e.g. Prèmbon, Bondrès or Arja) may be 
                                                
38 A more recent example is Bloch’s presumption in ‘The past and the present in the present’ (1977) that there is a real, 
fixed and self-evident yardstick of time as universal, linear and irreversible, against which ‘ideological’ deviations can 
be measured. 
39 On the problems of comparison, see Hobart 1987; and on the questionability of applying notions of genus and gender 
cross-culturally, Hobart 1995. 
unclear to Balinese, should indeed they worry about it.40 Genre as a classificatory or critical device 
seems to come into its own when talking about past performances, rather as Volosinov pointed out 
that the systematic nature of language was first postulated by philologists to deal with ‘dead’ 
languages (1973: 71-73). 
 It is easy to forget that the system in language – like the positing of genres – is a (questionable) 
methodological assumption. The recent introduction of Western-style institutions to Bali seems to 
have a hypostatizing effect on theatrical performances. Recently television, arts festivals and the 
growing importance of the Balinese Academy of Arts (Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia) as a centre 
of excellence are crystallizing the variety of regional practices into an increasingly fixed and 
overarching framework, as they assume an enunciative function and turn local audiences into 
passive viewers. More seriously, imposing ideas of genre on Bali pre-empts the study of how 
Balinese set about acting in and commenting on actual performances; and how the performances 
and commentaries change according to the prevailing circumstances. Bakhtin’s work may be useful 
as an example of the issues one might wish to consider in deciding how to set about an analysis of 
literary or theatrical events. The presuppositions and categories of such an analysis would have, 
however, to be reworked comprehensively for the society in question. Bakhtin did not go to Bali, 
still less did he constitute Balinese practice. 
 This apparent digression into Balinese theatre is relevant. Arguably it seems sensible to 
consider criticism as a process in its social context, and theatre is one of the occasions when critical 
comment is widely expected. Such a step however, as we have seen, leads easily into hypostatizing 
speech genres into essences, which enshrine ahistorical meanings and worldviews and treat people 
like Balinese as mere instruments of holistic culture. Many western academics tend to write about 
processes which depend on complex agency as if they were substantive. Theatre then becomes ‘a 
public space’ – or more subtly ‘an institutionalized time’– for criticism and we are launched into a 
wonderful journey of metaphorical make-believe. To judge from the popularity of works which 
represent other peoples’ actions in terms of images aimed at titillating Western readers’ 
imaginations, it is too good a way to fame, if not fortune, to give up readily.41 In the ensuing 
excitement, we tend to forget that such an approach sidelines questions of how different and 
heterogeneous audiences and actors understand what they are doing, what they say about it and 
how it affects what happens subsequently. 
 
A post-critical era? 
 The previous discussion suggests some awkward conclusions about criticism. Sceptically, and 
slightly tongue in cheek, if, as some suggest we are in a post-modern era, where the certain and 
systematic nature of knowledge can no longer be taken for granted, we are correspondingly in a 
post-critical era. Any theory of criticism which is based on a static model of epistemology is 
subject to the objections which proponents of post-structuralism and post-modernism have put 
forward of a unitary system of certain knowledge, universal in scope and independent of history. If 
there are knowledges, rather than simply coherent ‘knowledge’, to the extent that these knowledges 
are not entirely commensurable, presumably it follows that the critiques which are based on such 
                                                
40 For an introductory sketch of Arja, see de Zoete & Spies 1938: 196-210, who mention neither Prèmbon or Bondrès, 
which seem to be forms that flourished later. Commentative and classificatory accounts like these serve to fix a wide 
range of theatrical practices, which vary from place to place, into a constructed ‘system’. As Balinese come to read 
such accounts, they have the effect of providing the division into genres with a retrospective appearance of reality. 
Spies seems to have had an especially important and distinctive effect in helping to constitute the image of 
contemporary Bali to outsiders, including such anthropologists as Mead and Bateson, see Vickers 1989: 105-24. 
41 To invert the title of Lakoff and Johnson’s well known book Metaphors we live by (1980), I fear too often we create 
metaphors others die by. 
constructions of knowledge are not so either. To the extent that criticism depends on the exercise of 
rationality in some form, if the notion of rationality can be argued to be at best heterogeneous, at 
worst unworkable and ethnocentric, so does a coherent notion of criticism.42 
 There is a serious, or admonitory, strand in raising the question of whether we might be in a 
post-critical era. It is that a vague, uncritical notion of criticism has become devalued, or trivialized, 
by over-use. Just as Baudrillard (1983) has pointed out that representation has turned into the 
simulation, as practices of representation have changed (1983: 11-12). So much public and political 
criticism now arguably partakes in such simulacra. The metaphor of hyper-inflation refers to 
Baudrillard’s argument about So it is not entirely nonsensical to speak of the ‘hyper-inflation of 
criticism’, or even of ‘critical fatigue’, depending on whether one prefers an economic or a 
mechanical metaphor. On another score, there is a long ‘tradition’ of designating certain 
epistemological moves as ‘critical’ from Kant’s critiques of reason, to Sellars’s ‘critical realism’ to 
the ‘critical rationalism’ of philosophers in the ‘rationality debate’. Not to put too fine a point on it, 
as it is used nowadays, criticism here steers dangerously close to a defence of reworked positivist 
and enlightenment presuppositions, in which all objections to the canon are dismissed, usually a 
prior]. Insofar as critical thinking in the social sciences fails to apply the critique to itself, it is open 
to similar objections. 
 Evidently my strictures apply more obviously to Anglo-American philosophy and philosophy 
of the social sciences than to certain strands of continental European thinking where the problems 
of reflexivity, dialectic and history have been taken much more seriously. One obvious example is 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. I, for one, find myself in some perplexity, which centres 
on how far it is possible to underwrite an objective and universal account of criticism on 
transcendental grounds. My present position is, I think, pretty compatible with a contextualist or 
historicist view such as, say, Geuss’s reading (unsympathetic as it is in parts, as such analytical 
philosophical critiques often are) of Habermas’s reading (1971) of Adorno  
Agents’ epistemic principles and their standards of reflective acceptability just vary historically. 
Our standards of reflective acceptability and the social and cultural ideals in terms of which we 
criticize societies and ideologies are just part of our tradition and have no absolute foundation or 
transcendental warrant. For Adorno we must start from where we happen to be historically and 
                                                
42 I would submit that the long-running ‘rationality debate’ casts precisely such doubt on the workability of a simple, 
universal definition. For recent discussion see Wilson 1970; Hollis & Lukes 1982; Overing 1985; and a review by 
Scholte 1984. 
As I understand Balinese critical practices – theatrical and otherwise – it is not possible to ignore the historical and 
cultural situations in which criticisms are aired. Criticism on this account is an act in which people engage under 
various kinds of circumstance and is directed towards an object. That object cannot be entirely extrapolated from the 
conditions of its production and appreciation, including the particularities of the occasion, context, the words used and 
so on. Mind and the world are therefore not dichotomously separable. Events and actions may be potentially important 
in themselves, because past actions and their consequences are the raw materials (lakar) for critical reflection in at least 
two ways. Present circumstances (including individual human, or divine ones for that matter) bear the traces (laad) and 
are the consequences of past actions and events. And, second, critical thinking may reveal differences as easily as it 
may similarities. While people in theatre sometimes scrutinize, say, the past to try to discern a pattern or a broader 
significance behind events or in words themselves, perhaps more often they use the particular to apply, qualify and so 
rethink general precepts. The past provides an object through which to reflect on the outcome of diverse human 
interests and the divergence, and sometimes inscrutability, of human purposes. What happened, what is happening and 
what may happen are equally important, but you can only do something to change what is happening now, whenever 
now is. To understand (ngaresep) involves a two-way relationship (‘resep’ being a ‘two-sided word’ in kawi and 
Balinese, Zoetmulder 1982: 1543). It is both critically to penetrate, enter into and so affect, the matter in question and 
to be penetrated, entered, and affected by it. As you affect and change what you understand, understanding affects and 
changes you too. So distance does not confer superior knowledge, but more likely ignorance, disengagement, 
indifference. How can you criticize what you do not understand (on which, see Collingwood below)?  
culturally, from a particular kind of frustration or suffering experienced by human agents in their 
attempt to realize some historically specific project of ‘the good life’. The critical theories we 
propound in the course of this undertaking are extraordinarily fragile historical entities, which, 
even if effective and ‘true’, can never lay claim to any absolute standing – they are effective and 
‘true’ only relative to this particular historical situation and are bound to be superseded (Geuss 
1981: 63).  
 It is the later Habermas in particular (e.g. 1968, 1981), which poses comparative problems with 
the idea of knowledge as emancipatory and as grounded in universal criteria.43 First, Habermas’s 
shift from a work model of human activity to one of communicative action still begs questions 
about the nature of communication (see the Holquist quotation above). Recourse to communication 
arguably involves an additional set of presuppositions to those of action or work. And, if we are not 
to omit indigenous discourses altogether, Balinese notions of work and action seem to me far more 
potentially commensurable, at least in part, than that of communication, for which I have had 
difficulty identifying comparable Balinese terms of discussion. Second, the problem is not so much 
that humans through work may come to understand what they are thinking about better and explore 
new ways in which they may articulate ideas and the world about them. It is that such 
understanding may be grounded in ‘truth’ – which raises awkward questions about its 
transcendental or immanent status – and that such understanding provides the possibility of an 
emancipation, however incompletely realizable. Not only are there echoes of a timeless 
epistemologically guaranteed truth (see Hobart 1985), but there are unconsidered presuppositions 
about ‘freedom’ from one’s social conditions of living – consider the etymology of ‘emancipation’ 
– and of a Christian telos of salvation, here peculiarly available to library-bound scholars. 
 This brings us to a more general question. What is criticism for? Those Balinese with whom I 
have discussed the matter generally stressed that re-enacting the past in theatre was designed 
mituturin, to make the audience aware of the relevance of moral examples from that past. Likewise 
more direct admonition, panglèmèk, was aimed at making members of the audience reflect on their 
behaviour and so change it in the future. To the extent that a performance failed to induce reflection 
on action, in that respect it was in vain (gabeng).44 By contrast, in one way or another, critical 
theories tend to view the goal as emancipation through the operation of reason of some kind. 
Benhabib has however noted two contrasting versions of such emancipation as ‘fulfilment-
progressive’ and ‘transfigurative-utopian’. 
By the term ‘fulfillment’ I mean a view of social transformation according to which emancipation 
carries to its conclusion, in a better and more adequate form, the already attained results of the 
present. Emancipation is realizing the implicit but frustrated potential of the present. The term 
"transfiguration," by contrast, is intended to suggest that emancipation signifies a radical and 
qualitative break with some aspects of the present. In certain fundamental ways, the society of the 
                                                
43 As Benhabib has noted (1986: 41-42), Habermas shifts ambivalently between two contrastive possibilities of 
emancipation: ‘fulfilment-progressive’ and ‘transfigurative-utopian’. There are serious problems in claiming to 
underwrite a radically emancipatory project on the basis of reason.  
The alternative is clear: either emancipation is radical, and in that case it has to be its own ground and to confine what it 
excludes to a radical otherness constituted by evil or irrationality; or there is a deeper ground which establishes the radical 
connections between the pre-emancipatory order, the new ‘emancipated’ one and the transition between both - in which case 
emancipation cannot be consider as a true radical foundation. ...if the founding act of a truly rational society is conceived as 
the victory over the irrational forces of the past - forces which have no common measure with the victorious new social order 
- the founding act cannot itself be rational but is itself utterly contingent and depends on a relation of power' (Laclau 1992: 
124). 
44 Obviously much of what is taken as criticism works indirectly, as when people tell, or act differently towards, the 
person criticized. If the latter responds, this may also well be indirectly, through a third party. Equally someone may, 
for whatever reason, treat statements or actions as critical to someone else and respond purportedly on their behalf. I 
am grateful to Jeremy Kemp for pointing out this last possibility to me. 
future is viewed to be, not the culmination, but the radical negation of the present (Benhabib 1986: 
41-42).  
To this one might wish to add a Habermasian version of some partly emancipated human condition 
through reflective knowledge. While one could identify possible parallels in Indonesia, for 
instance, in the idea of the coming of a just king (Ratu adil) or in the meditative practices of 
Brahmana priests (e.g. Hooykaas 1966), I am far from convinced on the evidence available that 
either the escatologies or the means of achieving the goals are commensurable.45 As relatively little 
research has been carried out as yet on which Hindu and Buddhist treatises are to be found in Bali, 
far less what use is made of them, any general conclusion would be premature. I am left with the 
suspicion that the emancipatory goal of a transcendentally-based critique are more historically and 
culturally specific than is usually maintained. It is to such inadequately considered presuppositions 
of critical theories on offer that I address my devil’s advocacy of a post-critical era. 
 To end on a less pessimistic note, there is another sense in which the notion of criticism 
however may be, and has been, used, which partly overlaps with some usages in critical theory. It 
is, I think, more fully historically situation, dialogic and dialectic (whatever that fraught term may 
be taken to mean), without being reductively relativist. It centres on the link between understanding 
and criticism, as part of a historically constituted scale of forms. As the idea has been better put by 
Collingwood (from whom I take it) than I can express it myself, I cite him.  
Comprehension and criticism, or understanding what the writer means and asking whether it is 
true, are distinct attitudes, but not separable. The attempt to comprehend without criticizing is in 
the last resort a refusal to share in one essential particular the experience of the writer... If we 
refuse to criticise, therefore, we are making it impossible for ourselves to comprehend... 
Comprehension is inseparable from criticism in the sense that the one necessarily leads to the 
other, and reaches its own completion only in that process... If criticism must go with 
comprehension, and if comprehension means sharing the author’s experience, criticism cannot be 
content with mere disagreement; and in fact, whenever we find a critic systematically contradicting 
everything his author says, we are sure that he has failed to understand him... Criticism, when 
these two aspects of it are considered together, may be regarded as a single operation: the bringing 
to completeness of a theory which its author has left incomplete... Theoretically, the relation 
between the philosophy and the philosophy that criticizes it is the relation between two adjacent 
terms in a scale of forms, the forms of a single philosophy in its historical development (1933: 
217-20). 
Such a view not only brings out clearly the dialectical relationship between ostensibly opposed 
views, but the inextricable link between understanding and criticism, as well as the extent to which 
acts of understanding and criticizing are historical acts of agents. One might note that emancipation 
is not the central goal of such an activity. Rather there is a going-beyond (but not necessarily 
progress). 
 In this last sense, we could never be in a post-critical era, without giving up understanding as 
well. It is this usage of the idea of criticism, dialectically understood, that seems to me to be worth 
pursuing. It also becomes clear that our task of understanding the people with whom we work, in 
these terms (which must include theirs’, including other peoples’ ideas of such crucial notions as 
‘dialectic’ and dialogue’) has barely begun and will necessarily be fraught with difficulty. In a 
                                                
45 On the complexities of Indian ideas about liberation (e.g. mokśa, niḥśreyasa, apavarga) through knowledge 
(variously defined) in Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy alone, let alone for the differences between Nyaya and Vaisesika, 
see Potter 1977: 24-37. I would merely note that in the relatively simpler world of Balinese village society, 
emancipation, if one wishes to call it that, is notionally possible through the act of moksa. But the conditions of 
possibility of such an act involves the permanent destruction of the being who does so. Salvation, if one will, involves 
extinction. 
sensitive critique, Fabian outlines the dangers of uncritical liberal and Marxist assumptions about 
what it is we think we are doing and why. Evoking the spectre of the unintended consequences of 
anthropologists’ own actions, he points to the dilemmas inherent in doing ethnography at all 
(1991).46 
There is the further danger, noted by Talal Asad, that our efforts further strengthen the ‘strong’ 
languages of critical commentary, like English. Short of giving up the pursuit of understanding or, 
more likely, watching other people being eristically eliminated or subjugated however, I wonder if 
we can escape the dilemma of whether or not to write critical ethnography. Ethnography in this 
sense can never be done perfectly. At least though I think that we can recognize, and perhaps still 
write about other peoples’ practices of commentary and criticism, if we bear certain caveats in 
mind. Such writing will need to be self-critical and cannot ignore its potential unintended 
consequences (that bugbear of so much systematic thinking). If it is not to be latter-day 
epistemological imperialism, it will also involve other peoples’ commentaries and criticisms 
feeding back into anthropological discourse. (The effect of course will be to discombobulate what 
was anyway never as combobulated as it seemed.) Anything short of such a goal would be a 
travesty of any serious recourse to ‘dialogue’. I have scant hope that anyone will pay much 
attention to such ideas though. Even in the tiny world of anthropology, hegemonic interpretations 
and professional advancement militate against anything so self-critical. At best I fear the verdict on 
this Quixotic adventure will be: 
 
He’s a muddled fool, full of lucid intervals. 
Cervantes Don Quixote, Ch. 18. 
                                                
46 To the risk of the anthropologist becoming the ‘ultimate collaborateur’ of political domination (1991: 181), there is 
no simple solution. 
There seems to be nothing we can reasonably do except to give up writing altogether or hope to get away with it without 
causing too much harm. Perhaps, under the circumstances, the question must be how to do damage; how to shake, subvert 
and alter at least those ideological certainties which our discipline has been contributing to the justification of imperialism 
(Fabian 1991: 194, italics in the original). 
The present chapter is intended to tickle, as it is unlikely to shake, such certainties. The reader who thinks that either 
Fabian or I are beating our breasts about imaginary problems might find Pecora’s article (1989) on the political agenda 
in Clifford Geertz’s writing salutory. 
 Collingwood’s views also suggest a way of approaching the vexed and under-considered question of how 
appropriate it is for anthropologists to be critical of the people with whom they work. On this reading, one cannot 
understand uncritically, nor should one criticize without trying to understand. Evidently more saying on this topic, but 
that is a paper in itself. 
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